| INTRODUCTION
Human adenovirus (HAdV) is a common pathogen among children and adults. Infections of HAdV can cause a variety of clinical diseases, ranging from asymptomatic and self-limited conditions to pneumonia and even death. 1 As of now, at least 68 HAdV genotypes have been identified and are classified into seven species (A-G). 2 Furthermore, viruses in species B, C, and E are more commonly associated with symptomatic respiratory infections. 1, [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Human adenovirus type 55 (HAdV55), a member of HAdV-B family, was first identified from a military outbreak in Spain in 1969. 8 This virus used to be recognized as HAdV-B11a by partial characterization of its hexon and fiber epitopes. [9] [10] [11] In 2006, Michael et al. revealed that
HAdV55 was an emergent respiratory pathogen. 12 It had evolved from a homologous recombination between HAdV-B14 and HAdV-B11 in its hexon gene, which conferred changes in viral serotype and immune activity. In recent decades, HAdV55 has been associated with several respiratory infections outbreaks. 9, 11, 13, 14 Crowed communities, military training camps, and schools are common settings for HAdV infections.
Here, we describe a HAdV55 outbreak occurred in a neurosurgical inpatient department of a Jiangmen hospital in Guangdong Province, China. By reviewing patients' medical records, we identified the first case and determined the investigation period began on June 11, 10 days before the onset of the first case. All staff and patients in this neurosurgical department were surveyed for any symptoms of fever (≥38°C) and enlarged tonsils during the outbreak period. Laboratory-confirmed cases were defined as persons with positive HAdV55 PCR assays. Those not confirmed by the laboratory, but with symptoms and signs (fever (≥38°C) and enlarged tonsils), were defined as clinical-confirmed cases (possible cases). Throat swabs from all cases were collected and tested.
| METHOD

| Outbreak settings and investigation
Information on demographic characteristics, onset of illness, and clinical symptoms were collected. For the use of all above-mentioned specimens, written informed consent from all participants involved in the research was obtained (or from their parents or legal guardians in the case of a minor). This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Guangdong Provincial Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and was in compliance with the Helsinki Declaration. 
| Laboratory investigations
| Gene sequencing
The hexon, fiber, and penton genes of HAdV were ampli- 
| Phylogenetic tree
Multiple sequence alignments were performed with ClustalW, 15 and alignments were manually edited with Aliview. 16 For whole genome sequences, MAFFT software was used for alignment with default parameters (http://mafft.cbrc.jp/alignment/server/). Maximum likelihood (ML) trees were estimated in RaxML 17 using the generalized time-reversible (GTR) nucleotide substitution model with gamma distribution among site rate heterogeneity. 
| Statistical analysis
Data analysis was performed with spss 15.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). Differences with an error probability of P<.05 were regarded as significant. For categorical data, we used chi-square testing and Fisher
Exact testing as appropriate.
| RESULTS
| Outbreak epidemiology
The outbreak ranged from June 21 to July 8, 2016. The first cases were two nurses working at Neurosurgical Unit A. Our investigation identified 43 cases, including 24 laboratory-confirmed cases and 19 possible cases. The onset of illness in all cases is shown in Figure 1 .
Two peaks were observed. The first one was from June 21-28. It included 25 cases, among which 21 were nurses. The second was from June 29 to July 5. During this period, 13 of 15 infected inpatients were identified. It was observed that, within each unit, the first cases were all nurses. and signs between infected inpatients and infected medical workers did not differ (Table 3) . However, there were significantly more inpatients who developed pneumonia (P<.001).
| Outbreak investigation and infection control measures
We reviewed all inpatients' medical records and surveyed their visitors. Neither the inpatients nor their visitors had respiratory symptoms before the outbreak. We also interviewed all the chief doctors and nurses working in these three units and enquired about the staff's routine practice in the involved neurosurgical department. There are separated doctor offices, nurse stations, and nurse resting rooms within each unit. The staff had basically followed the standard infection control procedures when they cared for the patients. In the nurse stations and the resting rooms, the nurses preferred not to wear any protective equipment. They shared most office supplies, such as computers, medical records, and examination records. More often, it was the nurses who visited the doctors' offices for daily work communication, while the doctors rarely visited the nurse stations and their resting rooms, except for the acupuncturist, who was responsible for the entire department and was used to drinking water in nurse station A.
There was a dispensing counter in nurse station A from which nurses from unit B and the NSICU sometimes pick up medicines. Other interactions between units were fewer. One day before the outbreak, nurses from unit A had a party in a karaoke bar.
Control measures were implemented from June 23, when the hospital infection control committee was informed of this possible nosocomial infection. Environmental cleaning was enhanced. Self-protections, including hand hygiene and surgical mask wearing, were re-enforced.
All cases and their close contacts were followed up. On June 27, due to the increasing number of cases, further control measures were implemented. Staff with symptoms were either given medical leave or treated in isolation, as what had been implemented for the infected inpatients.
The personnel entering and leaving the involved neurosurgical department were restricted. Visitors to the department were required to wear surgical masks. In addition, screenings for similar symptoms were performed in the entire hospital. Specimens from cases and the environment were collected and sent to the local CDC for pathogen detection.
| Laboratory results
Viral testing was performed from June 28 to July 14 for 36 cases (Samples from the other seven cases were not available). A total of 64 respiratory samples were collected; 27 specimens from 24 patients were HAdVpositive. No other respiratory virus was identified. In addition, 29 serum samples, 13 fecal samples, and one urine sample were tested, among which six, eight, and one were HAdV-positive, respectively. HAdVs were successfully isolated for eight patients. To determine the viral type, hexon, fiber, and penton genes were amplified. These sequences were blasted in GenBank. All genes exhibited 100% similarity with HAdV55 strain HAdV55 XZ2012-492 (accession number KC857701). Furthermore, 37 environmental samples from the department and personnel, such as stethoscopes, doorknobs, office computers, and medical records, were also collected for viral testing, none of which showed positive results.
| Phylogenetic analysis
The fiber gene (1048 nucleotides (nt)), hexon gene (1603 nt), and penton gene (1206 nt) were obtained from eight HAdV strains isolated in the outbreak. Sequences of each gene were completely identical, suggesting the outbreak was caused by the single viral introduction.
Phylogenetic trees of fiber, hexon, and penton genes were constructed by integrating all closely related adenovirus sequences from GenBank (genetic similarity>80%, coverage>90%). The phylogenies 
| DISCUSSION
This study identified a cluster of adenovirus type B55 infection in the neurosurgical inpatient department of a general hospital. Through targeted surveys, the possibility of inpatients as the source of this outbreak was excluded. We suggested that the pathogen of this outbreak may have been introduced into the hospital by nurses in unit A. They had a party in a karaoke bar 1 day before the outbreak. One or some show a higher tendency of more severe illness in HAdV55-infected patients. 20 In this outbreak, 11 of 15 infected inpatients developed pneumonia. In contrast, only one staff member was diagnosed with pneumonia, and other staff developed mild and self-limited symptoms. T A B L E 3 Clinical features of cases during the adenovirus outbreak in a district hospital in Guangdong, China F I G U R E 2 Phylogenetic analysis based on the fiber (A), penton (B), hexon (C), and the whole genome sequence (D). Phylogenetic analysis is conducted using the maximum likelihood method and 1000 bootstrap replicates using the RaxML program. HAdV isolates from this outbreak are indicated by red color. Reference strains are labeled with their GenBank accession numbers, countries of collection, and dates of collection (if available). Branches with supporting bootstrap value over 80% are indicated
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One possible reason may be body immune competence. Recent studies have shown that the immune system plays a crucial role in the clearance of HAdV viremia and survival of the host. 21, 22 Owing to underlying conditions, it is more likely for the infected inpatients to develop severe diseases. 23, 24 Given the possible association of severe disease with HAdV-55, this virus should be considered sooner in such hospital settings to allow appropriate medical care.
Healthcare-associated infection has been a constant issue since the early days of medicine. To our knowledge, this is the first report on an HAdV55-associated hospital outbreak. HAdV is an ideal agent for nosocomial transmission due to its prolonged shedding and its resilient nature. It can spread rapidly through close contact with infected patients or by exposure to fomites. During this outbreak, standard infection control procedures, such as hand washing, wearing surgical masks, and hair caps, were implemented as routine policy in the hospital. However, some staff may have adopted these infection control precautions improperly due to negligence or weak control awareness. Our study has limitations. First, several respiratory viruses could cause respiratory infections. 25 Previously published data show that it is difficult to make a reliable distinction among these pathogens based on clinical signs and symptoms. 26 To ensure case findings, we used a sensitive definition of possible cases in this outbreak, which may include both adenovirus and non-adenovirus infections, as well as infected patients who may not have been involved in this infection cycle.
Our investigation found 27 throat swab specimens with a HAdVpositive status, while pathogens for the remaining cases were not fully clarified. Therefore, the attack rate may have been overestimated.
More laboratory tests should be carried out to understand pathogenic characteristics. Second, based on our investigation, we implicated that the virus could be intruded from outside of the hospital by the nurse or would be helpful to trace the transmission origin and provide more molecular epidemiology baseline data in China.
